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REASONABLE DOUBT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: THE SUPREME COURT
STRUGGLES TO LIVE BY ITS PRINCIPLES
HENRY D. GABRIEL*
AND KATHERINE A. BARsI**
I. INTRODUCTION
The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard "plays a vital role in
the American scheme of criminal procedure."' A common apho-
rism states that it is better to have ten guilty people go free than
to have one innocent person erroneously convicted. 2 This intrinsic
societal belief has been encapsulated in the requirement that a
criminal defendant be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to
be convicted. 3
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that this high burden of proof is so important that it rises to the
level of a fimdamental constitutional right.4 Although often reaf-
firming the significance of this right, the Court has allowed its
* Henry D. Gabriel, Professor of Law at Loyola University School of Law. Professor
Gabriel was counsel for the petitioner in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), a case
which is discussed in this article.
** Katherine A. Barski, Juris Doctor, 1996, Loyola University School of Law.
1 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (discussing reasonable doubt standard as
.prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error").
2 See id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). "In a criminal case.., we do not view the social
disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting some-
one who is guilty." Id.; Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in
Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HAsv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 627, 634 (1994) (noting that standard
to convict is intentionally difficult so as to protect innocent people, "admittedly at the cost
of freeing many guilty people"); William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L.
REv. 329, 333-34 (1995) (stating that "fundamental value of Anglo-Saxon justice [is] that it
is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free").
3 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (indicating that "presumption of innocence
is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials"); see also Rachel M.
Capoccia, Piercing the Veil of Tears: The Admission of Rape Crisis Counselor Records in
Acquaintance Rape Trials, 685 S. CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1390 (1995) (noting that "American
criminal justice system operates under the assumption that each person is innocent until
proven guilty"). But see Marla L. Mitchell, Beyond a Book Review: Using Clinical Scholar-
ship in Our Teaching, 2 CLINicAL L. REV. 251, 270 (1995) (book review) (claiming that sys-
tem "in reality requires proof of innocence").
4 See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 368 (characterizing beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of proof as "constitutional safeguard").
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concerns for federalism, finality of convictions, and conservation of
judicial resources to create stringent obstacles that prevent relief
for a violation of this right. In this article, we discuss the conflict
between the fundamental constitutional right that a defendant
must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to be convicted
and the countervailing interests that the Court has allowed to di-
lute the essence of this principle.
A. Establishment of the Reasonable Doubt Standard
The necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequi-
site to conviction of a crime dates back to the early years of our
Nation.5 The most important purpose of this standard is to ensure
that the accused is presumed innocent until the State proves
otherwise.6 Without this presumption, individuals cannot have a
relationship with the State that accords with basic democratic
principles.7
The Supreme Court has long assumed that proof of a criminal
charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.'
The Court explicitly acknowledged this requirement in In re Win-
ship.9 The Winship Court found that the constitutional mandate
for the reasonable doubt standard was embedded in the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which
"protect[ I] the accused against conviction except upon proof be-
5 See id. at 361 (noting origins of beyond a reasonable doubt standard); see also Christo-
pher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 18 FALL
FLETCHER F. WoRL AFF. 77, 96 (1994) (noting that "[t]he reasonable doubt standard has
been the controlling standard for conviction in common law nations for over 200 years").
6 See Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an
Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRuhflNoLOGY 402, 445 (1994). "The burden
of proof requires the prosecution to persuade the jury of the accused's guilt; the presump-
tion of innocence allows the accused to 'remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution
has taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected persuasion'.. . ." Id. (citations
omitted).
7 See id. at 451 (discussing how movement "towards an inquisitorial system could also
signal a larger transformation in the relationship between the citizen and the state"); see
also Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial Prosecution and
Wrongful Conviction in Maycomb, 45 ALA. L. REv. 403, 408 (1994) (describing presumption
of innocence as "central to our jurisprudential traditions").
8 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (citing cases which indicate that Con-
stitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
9 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
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yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."10
The reasonable doubt standard provides a solid foundation for
the presumption of innocence." Because there is a risk of convic-
tion resting on factual error when the accused's liberty is at stake,
the reasonable doubt standard impresses on the factfinder the ne-
cessity of judging the facts to determine guilt with the utmost
certainty.' 2
The right to a jury trial, or the right to be found guilty by a jury
of one's peers, coincides with the reasonable doubt standard. 13
These two principles working together ensure that the state is
limited to convictions based not on the unbridled power of the
state but only on a determination by individual citizens, the jury,
to whom the state must satisfy its burden.
Recognizing that the jury is the instrument by which the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard is upheld, the Court, in Cage v. Loui-
siana,'4 examined a reasonable doubt jury instruction in light of
Winship. 5 The Cage Court considered "how reasonable jurors
could have understood the charge as a whole."' 6 Finding that the
instruction contained words that could have been interpreted to
allow a guilty verdict based on a degree of proof lesser than that
required by the Due Process Clause, the Court held the instruc-
tion unconstitutional.' 7
10 Id. at 364; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-14, 315 (1979) (restating
that requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established for every element
of crime charged).
11 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363; see also Jennifer R. Treadway, 'Residual Doubt' in Capi-
tal Sentencing: No Doubt It Is an Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
215, 236-37 (1992) (discussing significance of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
and presumption of innocence).
12 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64; see also Leslie J. Harris, Constitutional Limits On
Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of Changing Concepts of Fundamental Fairness,
77 J. CnmM. L. & CRIMHNOLOGY 308, 353 (1986) (discussing standard as described in
Winship).
13 See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 79, 143 (1988) (discussing intertwining of reasonable doubt standard and right to
jury trial).
14 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
15 Id. at 40-41 (discussing applicable jury instruction in light of Winship and reasonable
doubt standard).
16 Id. at 41.
17 Id. The Court found that equating a reasonable doubt with a "grave uncertainty" and
an "actual substantial doubt" suggested a higher degree of doubt than is required for ac-
quittal under the reasonable doubt standard. Id.
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Cage underscores the necessity of both the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard and a jury determination of guilt.18 To ensure that
the jury makes its decision based on the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, the instruction must properly convey the mean-
ing of a reasonable doubt.' 9 Furthermore, to ensure that it is in
fact the jury that makes this determination, the Cage Court fo-
cused on how the jurors "could have" interpreted the language of
the instruction.20
The Court reiterated the importance of a jury determination of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in Sullivan v. Louisiana.2 1 The
Sullivan Court held that the use of a reasonable doubt instruction
that could have been misinterpreted is not subject to harmless er-
ror review.22 The erroneous instruction is not subject to a determi-
nation that it was harmless and, therefore, of no significance to
the outcome. In other words, if there is a deficient instruction on
reasonable doubt, the conviction must be overturned. Further-
more, to guarantee that the jury has made this determination, if
there is any question as to whether the jury could have been mis-
led about the standard, there can be no conviction.
The Sullivan Court explained that the use of Cage jury instruc-
tions results in "a misdescription of the burden of proof ... which
vitiates all of the jury's findings."23 Thus, a deficient reasonable
doubt jury instruction not only dilutes the standard of proof to a
level below that which is constitutionally permissible, but also
precludes a guilty verdict from even coming into existence.24 Both
Cage and Sullivan stand for the proposition that without a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction.
18 Id. (noting that erroneous instruction or interpretation can allow "finding of guilt
based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause").
19 See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam) (indicating that jury must
understand meaning of beyond reasonable doubt standard).
20 Id.
21 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080 (1993) (discussing prosecution's burden and importance of
factfinder's determination regarding guilt).
22 Id. at 2082 (describing use of harmless error review under such circumstances as
"illogic[al]").
23 Id. at 2082.
24 See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curiam) (stating that jury instruc-
tion at issue could have resulted in finding of guilt "based on a degree of proof below that
required by the due process clause"); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)
(discussing importance of reasonable doubt standard in protecting individual's liberty and
in commanding respect and confidence in criminal law system).
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B. Limitations on the Reasonable Doubt Standard
While acknowledging the importance of a determination of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt and attempting to clarify the constitu-
tional mandates of a reasonable doubt jury instruction, 5 the
Court has struggled with the conflict between this principle and
the Court's concerns for finality, federalism and conservation of
judicial resources.26 The result of this struggle has been to dimin-
ish seriously the availability of challenges to deficient reasonable
doubt jury instructions.
1. Retroactivity
The Court has restricted the availability of challenges to defec-
tive reasonable doubt instructions in the area of retroactivity. In
Teague v. Lane,27 the Court held that a new rule cannot be applied
retroactively on collateral review where a conviction was final
prior to the announcement of the new rule.28 Cage has been held
to be a new rule,29 therefore habeas petitioners will be denied re-
lief from a Cage error if their direct appeal ended before the Cage
decision. 0 The new rule results in the anomalous situation that,
although there has been no conviction, there can be no relief be-
cause of the Teague bar and the defendant will stand convicted.31
The Court, however, may have resolved this conflict when, in
Sullivan, it held that deficient reasonable doubt jury instructions
25 See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243-44 (1994) (discussing whether jury in-
struction, in requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, passed constitutional muster); Sulli-
van v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993) (noting that denial of right to jury verdict of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt constitutes error); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72-73
(1991) (analyzing constitutionality of jury instruction).
26 See, e.g., George M. Dery III, The Atrophying of the Reasonable Doubt Standard: The
United States Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity in Victor v. Nebraska and Its Implica-
tions in the Courtroom, 99 Dic L. REv. 613, 617 (1995) (discussing inconsistency of
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on reasonable doubt standard).
27 489 U.S. 288 (1990).
28 Id. at 305-10.
29 See Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, 1312 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding Cage to be new rule),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2966 (1993), cert. granted on reh'g and judgment vacated, 114 S. Ct.
1365 (1994); Skelton v. Whitley, 950 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 102 (1992). However, the reason for this finding is unclear. Arguably, Cage is nothing
more than a factual application of the long-espoused principle, formalized in Winship, that
a defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to be guilty of a crime.
30 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 288 (discussing effect of "new rule" on petitioners).
31 See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BuFF. L. REv. 329, 419-20 (1995) (defining "new rule" and
describing situation that results when new rule is applied to pre-Cage decision).
1995]
78 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
are not subject to harmless error review.3 The Sullivan holding
arguably brings Cage within an exception to the Teague bar on
retroactive application, which is that there may be retroactive ap-
plication of new rules that involve procedures "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty."33 Although the Teague Court attempted to
strike a balance between finality of judgments and certainty of
outcomes, 34 the finality interest must yield where the constitu-
tional error involved is of such a nature that there can be no confi-
dence in the result produced by the procedure in question.35 Be-
cause Sullivan teaches that the consequence of an improper
reasonable doubt jury instruction is that there has been no convic-
tion, Cage comes within the exception to Teague and should,
therefore, be applied retroactively on collateral review. 36 Thus,
retroactivity appears to be one area in which the reasonable doubt
principle has prevailed over competing judicial concerns.
2. Standard of Review and the Language of the Jury
Instructions
Notwithstanding Sullivan, all is not well. In Victor v. Ne-
braska3 7 the Supreme Court greatly diluted the fundamental
principles established in Cage and Sullivan, with regard to both
the standard of reasonable doubt and the jury's role in the deter-
mination of guilt.38
As for the jury's role, the Victor Court held that the proper stan-
dard for measuring the constitutional validity of a reasonable
32 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080 (1993) (discussing applicability of harm-
less error review).
33 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (applying exception first advocated by Jus-
tice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971)); see also Paul J. Heald,
Retroactivity, Capital Sentencing, and the Jurisdictional Contours of Habeas Corpus, 42
ALA. L. REV. 1273, 1277-78 (1991) (discussing Teague exceptions).
34 Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-09 (recognizing that interest of finality must be considered);
see also Ellen E. Boshkoff, Resolving Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane, 65 IND. L.J. 651,
654 (1990) (discussing Teague Court's interest in finality); Heald, supra note 33, at 1278-79
(same).
35 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (recognizing that interest in finality is outweighed if con-
stitutional error would result); see also Heald, supra note 33, at 1279 (noting that concerns
regarding constitutional error override concerns for finality of judgment).
36 See Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175,178 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding, on remand from United
States Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider in light of Sullivan, that Sullivan
permits retroactive application of Cage on collateral review); Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154,
1156-57 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that Cage falls within second Teague exception and there-
fore may be retroactively applied on collateral review).
37 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
38 See Dery, supra note 26, at 614-16 (discussing dilution of reasonable doubt standard
in Victor).
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doubt jury instruction is whether there is a "reasonable likeli-
hood" that the jury applied the instruction as a whole in an uncon-
stitutional manner.3 9 In the earlier Cage opinion, however, the
Court had endorsed a different standard of review: 40 "In constru-
ing the instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have
understood the charge as a whole."4 ' In Victor, the Court adopted
a more stringent standard of review for a Cage error.4 2 By doing
so, the Court has supplanted the judge's determination for that of
the jury.4 3 In Cage, the question of whether a jury could have been
misled clearly focuses on the jury's role in determining guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.44 The "reasonable likelihood" standard
adopted by the Victor Court, on the other hand, neglects the ques-
tion of what the jury might have done and instead focuses on what
the court thinks a reasonable jury should have done.45 This is
nothing more than the harmless error standard coming in the
back door, a result that contradicts Sullivan, and greatly dimin-
ishes the ability to challenge defective jury instructions.46
In addition to usurping the jury function by heightening the
standard of review, the Victor Court greatly diminished the rea-
39 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243; see also Boyde v. California, 484 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). This
standard was first promulgated by the Court in Boyde. Id. The Boyde Court explained that
the "reasonable likelihood" standard requires a showing of more than how a single hypo-
thetical "reasonable" juror might have acted, but does not require a showing that the jury
was more likely than not to have been impermissibly influenced by the instruction. Id.
40 See Matt Nichols, Victor v. Nebraska: The "Reasonable Doubt" Dilemma, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1709, 1714-15 (1995) (discussing differences between Cage and Victor standards of
review).
41 Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990).
42 See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). The Court indicated that "beyond
a reasonable doubt" is the appropriate standard. Id.; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75
(1991). The Estelle Court noted that Cage had endorsed a different standard of review than
that generally applied. Id. at 72 n.4. Estelle, by disapproving the standard of review lan-
guage in Cage, cast considerable doubt on Cage's validity and, to "once again speak with
one voice on this issue," the Court reaffirmed the general standard. Id. Whether Cage jury
instructions would survive review under this standard was left unresolved. Id.; see also
Nichols, supra note 40, at 1718. The author notes that the Estelle standard revolved around
whether there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied the instruction in an
unconstitutional manner. Id.
43 See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1251.
44 See Nichols, supra note 40, at 1710 (discussing jury's role and understanding of rea-
sonable doubt instructions).
45 See Shelagh Kenney, Upholding the Constitutional Merit of Misleading Reasonable
Doubt Jury Instructions, 85 J. CaiM. L. & CRnvfmOLOGY 989, 993-95 (1995) (discussing
Victor decision and jury role).
46 See Raymond A. Kimble, Note, The Standard for Determining the Harmfulness of a
Constitutional Trial Error on Collateral Review Is Whether the Error Had a Substantial
and Injurious Effect or Influence in Determining the Jury's Verdict - Brecht v. Abraham-
son 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 771, 771-73 (discussing diminution of
constitutional rights by application of harmless error standard).
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sonable doubt standard itself by narrowly confining the basis for
challenging jury instructions that contain misleading language.47
The Victor Court upheld two sets of jury instructions similar to
those used in Cage48 by distinguishing them on the ground that
the questionable words and phrases found to be misleading in
Cage were neutralized by their context in the instructions taken
as a whole.49 The Victor Court emphasized that its concern in
Cage was "that the jury would interpret the term 'substantial
doubt' in parallel with the preceding reference to 'grave uncer-
tainty,' leading to an overstatement of the degree of doubt neces-
sary to acquit."50 The Court explained, however, that these prob-
lematic terms can be neutralized by other words that prevent the
jury from requiring anything more than a reasonable doubt to ac-
quit.51 A petitioner has a substantial burden to prove that a due
process violation resulted from an inadequate jury instruction be-
cause the Constitution does not require that any particular lan-
guage be used for an instruction to be constitutional.
The Court's analysis, however, appears to be no more than a
pretextual retreat from the standard articulated in Cage. Instead
of focusing on whether a jury could have been misled by the in-
struction, the Court categorically decides that the jury would not
have been.52 This standard is nothing more than a transparent
usurpation by the Court of the jury's rightful domain.
Victor contradicts the fundamental principle that, in a jury
trial, the jury, not the judge, should ultimately determine the de-
fendant's guilt. Victor also calls into question the continued via-
bility of the reasonable doubt standard. Unlike the other Court-
47 See id. at 798 (noting that reasonable doubt standard is diminished by harmless error
review).
48 Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, "1242, 1248 (1994) (comparing Cage instructions
with those given at trial of petitioners and noting that all included "moral certainty" as
partial definition for reasonable doubt).
49 Id. at 1239; see also Nichols, supra note 40, at 1715 (discussing Court's comparison of
jury instructions in Cage and Victor).
50 Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250; see also Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (finding
instruction referring to "grave uncertainty" and "substantial doubt" unconstitutional).
51 See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250. The Court found that the words "substantial doubt"
were neutralized because they were explicitly distinguished from "mere possibility," "bare
imagination," and "fanciful conjecture." Id. at 1241-42. "[Slubstantial doubt" was also miti-
gated by use of the "hesitate to act" test. Id. The disabling aspects of the phrase "moral
certainty" were alleviated by reference to the need for an "abiding conviction" of the defend-
ant's guilt, as well as by the instruction that the jurors should base their verdict on the
evidence presented. Id. at 1242.
52 See id. at 1248 (stating that it was not reasonably likely that jury understood words
.moral certainty" to suggest standard lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt").
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imposed limitations discussed in this article, however, these limi-
tations were not justified by any countervailing policy. Given the
importance of the principle, and its acknowledgement by the
Court in other cases, the Victor opinion is baffling.
3. Procedural Bars To Relief
Assuming that a claimant is not barred by the barriers erected
by Teague and Victor, he or she may still encounter procedural
bars to relief where a review of an alleged Cage violation is sought
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a collateral action. 53
Although the law of habeas corpus began as a mechanism to chal-
lenge the wrongful detention of any person, it has expanded in
scope and application to focus on a penumbra of constitutional
rights and liberties.54 Thus, a writ of habeas corpus is used today
to challenge convictions where a prisoner claims a violation of cer-
tain constitutional rights.
In evaluating habeas corpus petitions, courts have sought to de-
termine whether there was a "fundamental defect" which inher-
ently resulted in a "complete miscarriage of justice."55 A "funda-
mental defect" results in a "complete miscarriage of justice"
53 See Comment, Criminal Law: Adams v. Aiken, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 297, 298-301
(1993) (noting that Adams Court, in relying on Teague, "found that the new rules do not
apply retroactively to cases brought on collateral review"); Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus
as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 415, 424-26 (1990-91)
(illustrating Teague's new approach to retroactivity).
While its exact origins are uncertain, the writ of habeas corpus is traceable to the Eng-
lish common law. See William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus:
A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983, 1054 (1978). After the founding of the
nation, the writ was successfully transplanted to the American colonies and into the Con-
stitution of the United States. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. "The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva-
sion the public Safety may require it." Id.
54 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402-06 (1963) (documenting historical writings that
indicate "habeas corpus was available to remedy any kind of governmental restraint con-
trary to fundamental law"); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 453 (1953) (challenging death
sentence based on alleged constitutional violations, primarily racial discrimination); Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915) (stating "[t]here is no doubt of the authority of the
Congress to thus liberalize the common law procedure of habeas corpus in order to safe-
guard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States").
55 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (holding that failure of trial court to
ask defendant represented by counsel whether he had any words before sentencing is not
"fundamental defect" cognizable under habeas corpus); see Christopher D. Cerf, Federal
Habeas Corpus Review of Nonconstitutional Errors: The Cognizability of Violations of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 1007-08, 1011-14, 1016-18,
1021-23 (1983) (discussing in-depth "fundamental defect" test); Jack A. Guttenberg, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Bal.
ance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 617, 669 (1984) (discussing Hill language as applied in United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979)).
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whenever a conviction or sentence is the result of a violation of a
federal constitutional right.56 Therefore, a writ of habeas corpus
should be the perfect vehicle for challenging improper reasonable
doubt jury instructions.
The appointment of more conservative Supreme Court justices
and changes in the governing federal habeas statutes, however,
have resulted in a re-examination of the law of habeas corpus.
57
Habeas corpus law has been restricted and is now more a matter
of judicial discretion than constitutional imperative.5" Stringent
obstacles now exist to second, successive, and procedurally de-
faulted claims. 59
The most common stumbling block to a writ of habeas corpus is
a procedural default. A procedural default exists when there is
failure to comply with a procedural rule, such as a rule requiring
that a given claim be raised at a certain time or in a certain man-
ner or court. ° If a claim is forfeited for purposes of direct appeal
by reason of a procedural default, the claim is also deemed for-
feited for post-conviction purposes, so long as the procedural de-
fault rests on "adequate and independent state grounds."6'
56 See Deborah J. Gonder, Innocent of Death: A Habeas Petitioner's Last Chance, 48 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 229, 246-47 (1993) (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)). "[T]he fundamental miscarriage of justice exception focuses on
the preservation of constitutional rights." Id.
57 See Max Rosenn, The Great Writ: A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 Omo ST. L.J.
337, 355 (1983) (noting that since 1976 Supreme Court has limited availability of federal
habeas relief).
51 See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 n.16 (1986) (noting that "unlimited
availability of federal collateral attack burdens our criminal justice system"); Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (holding that failure to make timely objection under state
rule barred habeas review of Miranda claim); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976)
(holding that habeas corpus relief was not required where state provided "opportunity for
full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claim").
59 See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 86 (holding that absent showing of "cause" and "preju-
dice," federal habeas corpus review is barred); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129
(1982) (reaffirming Wainwright's requirement that prisoner demonstrate "cause" and "ac-
tual prejudice").
60 See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 81-91. Procedural default commonly results from a de-
fendant's failure to follow state rules requiring the defendant to make a contemporaneous
objection to particular improprieties at trial or requiring that certain issues be raised by
the defendant on appeal in the state system. Id.
61 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). Federal habeas courts will presume that no adequate and in-
dependent state ground exists only when the state court's decision "fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy
and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion."
Id. at 733; Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). If the last state court to address
the claim ignores a potential state procedural default and reaches the merits of the claim,
federal habeas courts may consider the claim. Id.; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 733-35. If the state
court addresses both the substantive merits and a state procedural default when rejecting
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A court may also refuse to entertain a second or successive
habeas petition.62 Under the successive petitions rule, a court may
dismiss a second or subsequent petition if the claim raised was
denied on the merits in the previous proceeding and the ends of
justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the claim. 61
The petitioner has the burden of showing that relitigation of the
claim would serve the interests of justice.6 4
Even if a petitioner raises new grounds in a later petition, the
court may still dismiss that petition if the failure to allege those
grounds in the earlier petition constitutes "an abuse of the writ."
65
Under the abuse of the writ rule, a second or subsequent motion
on behalf of the same petitioner and involving the same custody
may be dismissed at the discretion of the court if the petitioner
"deliberately withheld" a claim from an earlier petition or has
"otherwise abused the writ."66
The same standard is used to determine whether to excuse a
procedural default when a state court decision is found to rest on
adequate and independent state grounds. 7 To overcome the abuse
a petitioner's claim, federal habeas review of the claim remains precluded unless the pre-
sumption against adequate and independent state grounds is applicable. Id.; Ylst, 501 U.S.
at 803. When the last state court judgment does not indicate whether it is based on proce-
dural default or on the merits of a federal claim, the federal court will presume that the
state court has relied on the same grounds as the last "reasoned" state court opinion. Id.
62 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2478, 2485. Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Sec-
tion 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides: "A second or successive peti-
tion may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for
relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior
petition constituted an abuse of the writ." Id.
63 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-54 (1986)
(emphasizing importance of finality and goals of federalism, deterrence, punishment and
rehabilitation).
6 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (stating that if petitioner is unable
to show cause, failure to raise claim earlier may be excused by showing of fundamental
miscarriage of justice); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292-93 (1948) (indicating initial
burden is on petitioner).
65 Amos E. Hartston & Jay Gonzalez, Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 83 GEO. L.J.
1392, 1420 (1995) (discussing abuse of writ of habeas corpus); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)
(1994).
66 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
67 McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490 (indicating same standard used when state court decision
is reached on independent state grounds); see Matthew L. Anderson, Requiring Unwanted
Habeas Corpus Petitions to State Supreme Courts for Exhaustion Purposes: Too Exhaust-
ing, 79 MiNN. L. REv. 1197, 1212-13 (1995) ("According to the [procedural default or in-
dependent and adequate state ground] doctrine, if a state court denies a prisoner's habeas
petition because the prisoner failed to meet the state's procedural requirements for seeking
relief, the federal court cannot provide relief."); James J. Turocy, Recent Decision: Reaching
the Merits of Successive and/or Abusive Petitions, 34 DuQ. L. Rlv. 373, 392-95 (1995) (not-
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of the writ rule in successive or second habeas petitions, the peti-
tioner must show "cause" for the default and "actual prejudice," or
that failure to review the claim will result in a "fundamental mis-
carriage of justice."68
The existence of cause turns on whether the petitioner can show
that an "objective factor external to the defense" hampered the de-
fense's efforts to comply with the procedural rule which was vio-
lated.6 9 Under this standard, cause can be demonstrated by show-
ing that the "factual or legal basis of a claim was not reasonably
available to counsel" or that governmental interference rendered
procedural compliance impracticable.7 ° Claims are "reasonably
available" even where their assertion would in all likelihood be
futile. 71 "[T]he question is not whether subsequent legal develop-
ments have made counsel's task easier, but whether at the time of
default the claim was 'available' at all."72
Claims of defective reasonable doubt instructions have been
raised in the courts as far back as 1965, 73 and therefore, this type
of claim was "available" at the time of most procedural defaults.
Thus, a petitioner with a Cage violation will not be able to demon-
ing that McCleskey Court refined previously obscure standard for evaluating abuse of writ
of habeas corpus).
68 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)). The Smith
Court held that it did not need to reach the merits of whether the lower court's failure to
accept the habeas writ of the defendant had caused the defendant prejudice, because the
defendant had failed to establish cause for non-compliance with the state rule. Id. at 533-
39.
69 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 488 (1986)); see also Smith, 477 U.S. at 537 (concluding petitioner failed to establish
cause for failure to comply with state procedural rules); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14 (1984)
(noting that defense counsel may not "forego a procedural opportunity" with intent to raise
habeas claim in event of tactical failure).
70 Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488 (noting that "the question of cause for a procedural default
does not turn on whether counsel erred or on the kind of error counsel may have made"); see
Reed, 468 U.S. at 13-16 (holding that "absent exceptional circumstance a defendant is
barred by decisions of competent counsel," but noting that if counsel has no reasonable
basis upon which to formulate constitutional question, second habeas claim may not be
precluded); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 124-35 (1982) (barring respondents from habeas
review because they failed to follow state procedural rules).
71 Engle, 456 U.S. at 130-3 1. The Engle Court noted that even "[i]f a defendant perceives
a constitutional claim and believes that it may find favor in the federal courts, he may not
bypass the state courts simply because he thinks that they will be unsympathetic to the
claim." Id. But see Reed, 468 U.S. at 15. The Reed Court indicated that "[a]lthough there is
a remote possibility that a given state court will be the first to discover a latent constitu-
tional issue and to order redress if the issue is properly raised, it is far more likely that the
court will fail to appreciate the claim and reject it out of hand." Id.
72 Smith, 477 U.S. at 537.
73 See, e.g., Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (alleging trial
court erred in defining reasonable doubt).
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strate cause under the current standard. Accordingly, a petitioner
will be denied relief from a constitutional violation which left a
petitioner convicted without a cognizable determination of guilt."4
Since both cause and prejudice must be demonstrated to obtain
relief, if cause cannot be shown, the petitioner has no relief irre-
spective of the prejudicial nature of the harm caused by the defec-
tive jury instruction. The absurdity of this result is demonstrated
by examining the extreme prejudicial effect of a Cage violation.
To meet the prejudice requirement of the cause and prejudice
standard, the petitioner must show "actual prejudice amounting
to a denial of fundamental fairness."75 In the case of jury instruc-
tions, the Supreme Court has noted that, to show prejudice, it is
not enough that "the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even
universally condemned."76 Instead, "the petitioner must demon-
strate that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire
trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.
Under Sullivan v. Louisiana,78 the reasonable doubt jury in-
struction clearly meets this standard. As stated in Sullivan, un-
constitutional reasonable doubt jury instructions take away the
essential element of a valid basis for reasonable doubt and thus,
the entire "trial cannot reliably serve its function."79 The use of
Cage jury instructions so infects the entire trial that the petitioner
is denied a true jury verdict against him and thus, there is effec-
tively no conviction. 0
An analysis of the prejudicial effect of an unconstitutional rea-
sonable doubt instruction on a petitioner's trial draws one to con-
clude that, because many petitioners are unable to meet the cause
and prejudice standard, a fundamental miscarriage of justice ex-
74 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-83 (1993) (finding harmless error review
inapplicable even though trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was identical to that
found improper in Cage).
75 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (noting that, notwithstanding failure
to show cause, petitioner may have earlier petition excused provided "he or she can show
that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the
claim"). See generally Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
303, 374 (1993) (questioning how Court can discern whether state's refusal to provide
mechanism for newly-discovered evidence of innocence violates traditional notions of fun-
damental fairness).
76 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982).
77 Id.
78 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
79 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113, S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993), 113 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).
80 See id. (indicating effect of Cage jury instructions on entire trial).
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ception for this type of error is necessary so that relief can still be
obtained.8 1
Traditionally, a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" occurred
whenever a conviction or sentence was the end result of a violation
of a federal constitutional right.82 A trio of habeas decisions, how-
ever, has shifted the focus of procedurally defaulted, successive, or
abusive habeas claims to a fact-based inquiry into the petitioner's
innocence or guilt and away from the preservation of constitu-
tional rights.8 3
The Court's focus on a presumption of guilt conflicts with the
principle that one is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Our
criminal justice system and the United States Constitution pro-
tect the right to a presumption of innocence until a determination
of guilt. Thus, the Court's focus on a presumption of guilt conflicts
with the nature of our criminal justice system8 4 when applied to a
Cage error because the denial of a factual determination of guilt
results in no basis for denying the petitioner's actual innocence.
The Court, however, has concluded that deference to the state's
interest in the finality of convictions, as well as principles of com-
ity and federalism, require limitations on second, subsequent, and
procedurally defaulted petitions.8 5 Thus, the Court linked the mis-
carriage of justice exception to a petitioner's innocence in order to
balance the desire to prevent its overuse with the need to "extend
relief to those who were truly deserving." 6 These interests conflict
because the type of error that arises from a Cage violation, unlike
other errors, results in the extraordinary case of there being no
determination of guilt.
81 See Ward v. Whitley, 887 F. Supp. 897, 901-02 (E.D. La. 1995) (noting that "[tihe
Court is gravely troubled that the apparent failure to instruct the jury in accordance with
constitutional principles on 'reasonable doubt' does not fall into the category of a 'funda-
mental miscarriage of justice') (citations omitted); see also Ward v. Cain, 53 F.3d 106, 108(5th Cir. 1995) (Politz, J., concurring) (expressing concern that person may be executed in
absence of jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
82 See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).
83 See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,537-39 (1986) (holding that petitioner did not meet
burden of showing prejudice where actual innocence was not proven); Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 497 (1986) (same); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444-55 (1986) (same).84 See Smith, 477 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing both Constitution and
criminal justice system serve values in addition to reliability of guilt or innocence
determination).
85 See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 862-63 (1995) (noting broadening of scope of
writ of habeas corpus posed danger to "finality of state court judgments and to principles of
comity and federalism").
86 Id. at 864.
[Vol. 11:73
1995] REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 87
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has continuously recognized the constitu-
tional right to a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and the impact of the reasonable doubt jury instruction on this
right. The Court, however, has limited the avenues by which a
petitioner can obtain relief for a violation of this constitutional
right. Because of the prejudicial effect of a Cage violation, the
Court's limitations are too restrictive and should yield to the need
to correct the fundamental defect that results from a Cage viola-
tion. Otherwise, we have the anomalous result that although a
claimant may never have been found legally guilty, there is no av-
enue for recourse.

